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I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of economic justice finds no robust expression in the law
of the United States. Although the term "justice" is replete with ambiguity,
it nonetheless evokes relatively familiar notions of equity and fairness in the
administration and application of law.' However, the term "economic
justice" is rarely discussed injudicial decisions or in scholarly analysis and
commentary. In fact, the term "economic justice" has been used only once
by the U.S. Supreme Court, appearing in a footnote in a concurring
opinion. The term appeared a few times in state court decisions, but those

* Associate Professor, Beasley School of Law of Temple University; B.A. 1976, Fordham
University; J.D. 1979, Cornell Law School; LL.M. 1995, Temple University School of Law. This
Article has benefitted from the excellent research assistance of Jonathan Cagan and Jocelyne
Peregoy. A version of this Article was presented by the author at the Third Annual Conference of
the Center for the Study of Race and Race Relations at the University of Florida, Fredric G. Levin
College of Law in Gainesville, Florida in March 2002.
1. For the purposes of this Article two definitions of the term justice found in the Oxford
dictionary of the English language, are helpful. First, "justice" is understood to embrace "the
quality of being [morally] just" and as "the exhibition of this quality or principle in action."
OXFoRD DICTIONARY 326 (2d ed. 1989). Additionally the phrase "to do justice" is described as
"to render [one] what is his due, or vindicate his just claims; To treat [one] fairly by
acknowledging his merits or the like; hence, to treat [a subject or thing] ... as is right or fitting."
Id.
2. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 506 n.6 (1980).
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cases dealt almost exclusively with unemployment or worker's
compensation claims.3 This tends to suggest that the concept of economic
justice, is outside the purview of judicial process, if not law itself. For
example, in 1916 the Connecticut Supreme Court said, "our concern is not
with the wisdom or economic justice of our statute . . . but with its
meaning."4
However, discerning the meaning of a statute is an exercise in both
understanding language and in understanding what that language means as
a function of the culture which has produced it.5 Although the term
"economic justice" is not a term of art in the common law tradition, it is
reasonable to assume that considerations of economic justice would arise
as one of the policy concerns that our legislatures and courts address in
formulating and interpreting law. That, for the most part, it is not a
consideration, raises interesting questions about the interaction of our legal
and economic cultures and our culture at large, particularly with regard to
the ways the benefits and burdens of society are allocated among its people.
This Article argues that today's mainstream economic theory, the
neoclassical paradigm,6 interacts with legal culture to obviate considerations

3. See, e.g., Melendez v. Johns, 76 P.2d 1163, 1163, 1171 (Ariz. 1938) (Lockwood, J.,
dissenting) (denying worker benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law on the grounds that
he was performing uncovered work when injured. The dissent observed that such a limitation was
based on notions of economic necessity rather than on economic justice); Great W. Mushroom Co.
v. Indus. Comm'n, 82 P.2d 751, 752 (Colo. 1938) (suggesting that unemployment compensation
law should be interpreted with regard to modem views of economic justice); State ex rel. Hughes
v. Cleveland, 141 P.2d 192, 206 (N.M. 1943) (Bickley, J., dissenting) (observing that the
provision of old age assistance is premised, among other things, on grounds of economic justice);
Economic justice also appears as a concern in some divorce proceedings. See, e.g., McCartney v.
McCartney, 50 Pa. D. & C.3d 339, 341 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1988).
4. Miller v. Am. Steel & Wire Co., 97 A. 345, 350 (Conn. 1916) (Wheeler, J.,
dissenting)
(considering where lead poisoning constituted an "injury" within the meaning of the workers
compensation statute).
5. For example, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis suggests that language is not merely a function
of the culture which creates but operates in a feedback loop impacting the way each native speaker
understands concepts like being, causality, and time. RICHARD R. WILK, ECONOMIES AND
CULTURES: FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY

104 (1996).

6. Generally:
[njeoclassical economics describes the economy as a state of equilibrium, in
which the forces of supply and demand interact to achieve optimal allocation of
society's resources. The focus of neoclassical economics is on the decisionmaking activity ofentrepreneurs, households and firms. It assumes that economic
decision-making is voluntary, informed and rational (i.e., utility maximizing).
The models used in neoclassical economics are based on transactions occurring
in exchange (i.e., barter) markets, in which perfect competition prevails. In these
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of economic justice. By the law's reliance on a methodology that is blind
to considerations of group status and group processes, and by its adoption
of values that marginalize conventional notions of equity and fairness in the
economic arena, supplanting them with the values of efficiency and selfinterest, the law becomes oblivious to its role in achieving and maintaining
the unjust distribution of assets, resources, and opportunities countenanced
by the neoclassical paradigm.
II. WHAT

IS ECONOMIC JUSTICE?

Bruce Ackerman has formulated a fairly conventional notion ofjustice.
Ackerman argues that the notion of justice embraces three fundamental
values: rationality, consistency, and neutrality.7 Rationality requires that the
exercise of power or privilege be subject to reasonable and arguably
persuasive explanation.8 When a distributive outcome is questioned, the
questioner is not suppressed, but is provided with acceptable justifications
for the ostensibly unjust consequence. Consistency requires that the
explanation advanced for the exercise of power or privilege in one instance
be in agreement with explanations provided for such behavior in other
circumstances.9 Finally, neutrality rejects an a priori claim of preference or
superiority as the basis for the exercise of power and privilege."
Thus, a defensible notion of economic justice would have three
requirements. First, in keeping with Ackerman's rationality construct, the
financial disparities between African-Americans and Whites, for example,
must be subject to a legitimate objective inquiry. Such an inquiry may not
be suppressed by force, coercion, willful blindness, or claims of impotence.

markets, goods are exchanged for goods, with money serving only as a neutral
intermediary in the exchange. Economic models based on exchange markets also
assume gross substitution effects. The axiom of gross substitution states that the
demand for good A will change only in response to a pricing differential between
good A and a substitute product. Exchange transactions also are envisioned as
being costlessly reversible, and as occurring in an ergodic environment, in which
there are no financial institutions. The market becomes the instrument of
allocation, and individual self-interested economic decisions collectively achieve
an optimal societal equilibrium.
Charles R.P. Pouncy, ContemporaryFinancialInnovation: OrthodoxyandAlternatives,51 SMU
L. REV. 505, 540-41 (1998) (citations omitted).
7. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE INTHE LIBERAL STATE 4-12 (1980).

8. Id. at 4-7.
9. Id. at 7-8.
10. Id. at 10-12.
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Traditionally, the economic aspirations of African-Americans have been
suppressed by violence. " In contemporary society, the economic well-being
of African-Americans is suppressed by the willful blindness protected by

colorblind notions of equality, and institutions of racial subordination are
protected by supposed limitations on constitutional interpretation and law
enforcement. 2 These protections flow from the law, which is best
understood in this context as an instrument used to justify and defend the
status quo.' 3 Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that have
consistently beaten back attempts to provide greater economic
opportunities for racial and social minorities 14 defy Ackerman's first
criterion forjustice. These decisions are based on constructions of the U.S.
Constitution that ignore the legacy of slavery and the contemporary

11. For example, in July 1917 African-American homes were attacked and burned in East
St. Louis, Illinois as a result of employment competition; White mobs attacked African-American
Chicago neighborhoods in July 1919 leaving over one thousand people homeless; six AfricanAmerican residents of Ocoee, Florida were killed and twenty-five African-American owned homes
were burned in November 1920; thousands were left homeless following a White attack on the
African-American community in Tulsa, Oklahoma in June 1921. Phyllis Craig-Taylor, Through
a ColoredLooking Glass: A View of Partition,FamilyLand Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 737, 775 n.223 (2000). Moreover, although the lynching of African-American men is
popularly thought to have resulted from alleged or imagined sexual transgressions involving White
women, it in fact resulted when African-Americans became successful competitors against White
businesses. Derrick A. Bell, Who's Afraid ofCriticalRace Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 895
(1995).
12. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitutionis Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16
(1991) (arguing that colorblindness actually enables racial discrimination in governmental
decision-making); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., ColorblindRemedies and the Intersectionalityof
Oppression: PolicyArguments Masqueradingas Moral Claims. 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 162-63
(1994) ("to assume that ignoring race in making social policy will bring about justice or achieve
morality is legal fantasy.").
13. Robin West, Progressiveand Conservative Constitutionalism,88 MICH. L. REV. 641,
661 (1990) ("[L]aw is a tool with which to achieve other independently defined purposes.");
Kenneth Nunn, Law as a Eurocentric Enterprise, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 323, 353-56 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (holding there is no implied
private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations adopted by federal agencies under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby denying plaintiff's right to challenge the Alabama
drivers license requirement that the licensing examinationobe administered only in English); Rice
v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (upholding white American rancher's claim that a NativeHawaiians-only voting limitation for trustees to the state's Office of Hawaiian Affairs constituted
unlawful racial discrimination); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(holding there was no compelling state interest shown that would justify a minority set aside
program in awarding municipal contracts where 50% of Richmond population was black and
historically only 0.67% of municipal contracts had been awarded to minority-owned businesses).
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institutional structure of racism in the United States. 5 These decisions
accept the disparities in wealth between African-Americans and Whites
produced by the ideology of white privilege without explanation, and reject
affirmative action remedies which would limit the benefits of whiteness.
Thus, these decisions are irrational under Ackerman's analysis.
Similarly, much of the affirmative action jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court makes no genuine effort to achieve consistency,
Ackerman's second criterion. In her analysis of the opinions of Justice
O'Connor on affirmative action, Joan Tarpley demonstrates O'Connor's
willingness to advocate judicial restraint with respect to decisions she
perceives to be in the interest of middle-class white women, while
embracing judicial activism with respect to dismantling efforts promoting
economic equity for African-Americans. 6 O'Connor's inconsistent
application ofjudicial policy violates Ackerman's consistency requirement,
further demonstrating the law's disinterest in justice in the economic
sphere. Finally, by its dedication to the maintenance of the status quo, the
law memorializes economic claims based on white privilege and seeks to
perpetuate them. 7
Our courts feign impotence and our legislatures lack incentive. A just
economic system would recognize race-based economic disparity and

15.
Disparities in wealth between blacks and whites are not the product of haphazard
events, inborn traits, isolated incidents or solely contemporary individual
accomplishments. Rather, wealth inequality has been structured over many
generations through the same systemic barriers that have hampered blacks
throughout their history in American society: slavery, Jim Crow, so-called dejure
discrimination, and institutionalized racism.
Joan Tarpley, A Comment on Justice O'Connor 's Quest for Power and its Impact on African
American Wealth, 53 S.C. L. REV. 117, 132 (2001) (quoting MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 12-13

(1995)). The essay by Tarpley presents a forceful discretion of the jurisprudence ofJustice Sandra
Day O'Connor, demonstrating it to be deeply embedded in a narrow, self-interested view of both
reality and the law.
16. Id. at 136-39. Tarpley also demonstrates the inconsistency between O'Connor's respect
for states' rights except when states' rights are being used to advance the economic well-being of
African-Americans and other people of color. Id.
17. Tarpley points to Justice O'Connor's introduction of a new standard into the
jurisprudence of affirmative action, i.e., that "the Government cannot employ race classifications
that unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups." Id.
at 127. The U.S. Supreme Court fails to acknowledge that "individuals who are not members of
the favored racial and ethnic groups," i.e., whites, have benefitted for centuries from this country's
policies of racial terrorism, forced enslavement, and genocide; it is these wrongfully obtained
benefits that it requires not to be "unduly burdening." Id.
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intervene to remedy the disorder. The failure of our system is not merely a
function of intransigent law, but is assisted by economic ideology that forms
the foundation for legal analysis and the justification for legal rules
promoting economic disparity. In this regard, Ackerman's notions of
rationality, consistency, and neutrality are subverted by the intervention of
the assumptions, values, and mechanisms of the neoclassical paradigm."8
Moreover, unlike mere legal precepts, neoclassical economic theory
promotes itself as a scientific discipline, imbuing its policies with the halo
of scientific truth. The result is a pseudoscientific rationalization of the
status quo.19 Without recognizing that the scientific character of economics
is based on misapplied analogies from the physical sciences, society will
continue to use ideology which masquerades as science as the foundation
for public policy and the methodology for allocating assets, resources, and
opportunities.2 °

18. Anti-essentialist Marxian thought argues that theory, like all societal processes helps
structure our understanding of reality from both descriptive and, normative perspectives.
Unfortunately, the ability of a theory to impact consensus is not a result of its accuracy or
correctness, but merely of its acceptance. See STEPHEN A. RESNICK & RICHARD D. WOLFF,
KNOWLEDGE AND CLASS: A MARXIAN CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 2, 11 (1987).
19. The physical sciences are distinguished from the social sciences, inter alia by their
discovery of and reliance on fundamental models.
Fundamental models reflect cause and effect relationships and can be used to
draw reliable conclusions about dynamic process. Most financial models are
either phenomenological models or statistical models. Phenomenological models
are "as if" models that reach conclusions by analogizing from known phenomena
to the unknown. As such, they offer interpretations rather than predictions.
Statistical models are used to find correlations between variables when a
dynamic process is not fully understood. Therefore, these models can generate
answers, but such answers have no necessary relationship to cause and effect.
Charles R.P. Pouncy, ContemporaryFinancialInnovation: Orthodoxy andAlternatives,51 SMU
L. REV. 505, 557-58 (1998). See also E. Ray Canterbery & Robert J. Burkhardt, What Do We
Mean By Asking Whether Economics is a Science?, in WHY ECONOMICS ISNOT YET A SCIENCE
15-22 (Alfred S. Eichner ed., 1983).
20.
However, in the neoclassical paradigm, methodological individualism and
economic rationality do not merely express the preferences of certain schools of
economic thought about normative issues, i.e., values, but are characterized as
scientific discoveries about the nature of reality, i.e., truth. When economic
rationality takes on the imprimatur of truth, human behavior that is inconsistent
with economic rationality becomes suspect both as irrational, in the sense that it
operates at odds with consensus reality, and immoral, in that it is less likely to
result in an efficient solution, a moral imperative in an economic theory based on
presumed scarcity. Rationality therefore assumes a privileged position above
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III. TALKING

ABOUT ECONOMICS

In American society, when we talk about economics we do so from the
perspective provided by the three lynch pins of the neoclassical paradigm.
First, we talk about the individual, meaning the individual person,
household, or firm. Neoclassical economic theory employs methodological
individualism, which assumes that the individual is the proper unit of
analysis for discussion." Only individuals exist. To the extent that group
behavior is considered at all, it is merely the aggregation of the behavior of
various individuals. Therefore, the ideas most closely associated with the
absence of genuine equality in society, such as racism, classism, and
discrimination, simply do not exist in the neoclassical paradigm. Or, ifthese
ideas do exist, they are thought to constitute rational, rather than wrongful,
conduct.22
Racism and classism are insulated from approbation by the second lynch
pin of neoclassical theory, economic rationality. Economic rationality
assumes that the origins ofhuman behavior are both simple and discernible.
People are thought to make decisions based on their desire to achieve an
outcome that best serves their personal interests, or personal utility.23
However, over time this assumption has become more difficult to sustain

views of human motivation based on theology, philosophy, or even ordinary
observation. Imbuing rationality with such privilege is essential if it is to be used
as a policy instrument to advance market capitalism as the only legitimate
economic way of life.

Pouncy, infra note 24, at 292. See also PHILIP MIROWSKI, MORE HEAT THAN LIGHT: ECONOMICS
AS SOCIAL PHYSICS: PHYSICS ASNATURES ECONoMICS 3, 107-08 (1989) (arguing convincingly that
economics has sought to model itself on the physical sciences, physics in particular, to among
other things, share in the legitimacy and authority bestowed on scientific discourse).
21. Methodological individualism is the assumption that the individual is the only relevant
source of economic data and information and the appropriate unit of analysis. Social phenomena
are viewed as merely the aggregation of the behavior of individuals. WILLIAM M. DUGGER,
UNDERGROUND ECONOMICS: A DECADE OF INSTITUTIONAL DISSENT xxviii (1992).
22. Howard J. Sherman, A Holistic-Evolutionary View of Racism, Sexism, and Class
Inequality, in INEQUALITY 39-41 (WILLIAM M. DUGGER et al. eds., 1996).
23. John T. Harvey, HeuristicJudgment Theory, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 47 (1998); Richard H.
Thaler, BehavioralEconomics, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. REP. 9-10 (1995).
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because of psychological,24 anthropological,25 sociological,26 and even
neurological data" demonstrating that human decision-making is far more
complex than neoclassical theory presumes.
Therefore, some members of the neoclassical community have bounded
the concept of economic rationality. This view recognizes that people try
to behave in a manner that best serves their interests, but may not achieve
the results they desire because of their imperfect ability to acquire,

24. See generally Lola L. Lopes, Psychology and Economics: Perspectives on Risk,
Cooperation,andthe Marketplace,45 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 197(1994) (discussing psychological
studies that go beyond the neoclassical assumption of rationality and self-interest to identify other
dimensions of decision-making).
25.
Beginning with Max Weber, anthropologists have viewed economic behavior as
a function of a society's culture and belief system rather than a universal
psychological motivation .... ("Weber, with his strong emphasis on institutional
variability, was almost completely free of the grosser biases involved in the
received doctrine of 'rational self-interest.' He was aware of the complexity of
the motivational forces underlying economic Activity."). . . . [Bironislaw
Malinowski viewed economic rationality as merely ethnocentric, and viewed
economic behavior as resulting from the interaction of social and symbolic
forces.... Although Franz Boas believed that rationality plays some role in
economic decision-making, he concluded that customs and traditions were the
more typical bases of decisions .... Even when people in traditional societies are
exposed to Western values, Manning Nash's study of the Quiche-Maya suggests
that they insulate their customary practices from Western notions of rationality.
Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Rational Rogue: NeoclassicalEconomic Ideology in the Regulation of
the FinancialProfessional,26 VT. L. REV. 263, 287 n.81 (2002).
26.
See, e.g., Richard R. Nelson, Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 111 (NEIL J. SMELSER & RICHARD SWEDBERG eds., 1994)
(rational choice theory provides an explanation for behavior that takes the actor's
objectives and constraints as given. One can argue that an explanation that
considers how cultural and social institutions have evolved and affect the choices
currently available to actors may provide a deeper and more illuminating
understanding of behavior than a rational choice explanation alone, even if the
latter can explain at one level).
Id.
27. Michael L. Platt, Neural Correlates of Decisions, 12 CURRENT OPINION IN
NEUROBIOLOGY 141 (2002) ("Recent research suggests that sensory judgments unfold through the
gradual accumulation of neuronal signals in sensory-motor pathways... Stored representations
of the outcome of prior actions activate neurons in many of these same areas during decisionmaking.").
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understand, and use information.2" Other segments of the neoclassical
community substitute revealed preferences for utility maximization in
understanding human motivation.' However, such alternative constructions
of neoclassical theory concerning human motivation only constitute a minor
embellishment on the essential theme of economic rationality, which is that
individuals make decisions that they believe will best serve their interests as
they understand them. Economic rationality *remains a foundational
construct in neoclassical thinking, and the neoclassical goals of prediction
and optimization would be impossible without an understanding of human
motivation as a function of individual self-interest. Thus, economic
rationality has become impervious to real science.
Even though we know that we are not instinctively rational decisionmakers, so many of us have been taught that we are, that we believe that
employing economic rationality, or some variant thereof, is the scientifically
correct way to make decisions.3 Thus, we tend to use economic rationality
as our heuristic device because formal education and popular culture has
told us that we should, not because it is the way that we would naturally
decide a matter. As one would expect, economists tend to demonstrate a
much greater propensity to behave in a manner consistent with economic
rationality than non-economists.3 Moreover, as rationality is absorbed by
the law, social sciences, and human culture, it ceases to be a mere
assumption of a particular theory, but intervenes with consensus reality.32

28. Peter J. Buckley & Malcolm Chapman, Economics and Social Anthropology Reconciling Differences, 49 HUM. REL. 1135-36 (1996).
29. E. RAY CANTERBERY, THE MAKING OF EcoNoMIcs 178 (1980).
30. General Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?, 15 J.
PuB. ECON. 295, 296 (1981) (economics graduate students were much more likely to employ the
rationality heuristic in decision-making than noneconomics majors). See also Pouncy, supra note
24, at 293-97 (contemporary financial professionals and people generally are indoctrinated to
accept and use economic rationality as their motivation for decision-making).
Rationality as an interpretative construct does not explain human decisionmaking as much as it structures the decisional processes of those who believe
that rationality is an appropriate, legitimate, and natural mode of decisionmaking. From this perspective, rationality as a necessary component of
neoclassical economic theory becomes a specific policy intervention in society,
which operates to achieve particular concrete consequences.
Id. at 293.
31. Pouncy, supra note 24, at 294-95.
32. George DeMartino, Anti-Essentialist Marxism and Radical Institutionalism: An
Introduction to the Symposium, 33 J. ECON. IssuEs 797-800 (1999) (Theory intervenes in society
to help produce the result the theory predicts.). Consensus reality is a shared view of the nature
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When we combine a belief that the individual is the proper unit of
economic analysis and that individuals base their decisions on their
perception of their own best interests, then discrimination and racism are
transformed from indicia of hatred or irrational hatred to good business
decisions.33 A good business person, as the focus of an individualistic
inquiry in economic justice ideology, will only make those decisions that
advance the best interest of her business. In the free, competitive labor
market assumed by neoclassical economics where employers and employees
have equal bargaining power and people consent to be unemployed or
underemployed, the rational business person will hire the best qualified
person regardless of race. By doing so, the rational business person will
promote the efficiency of her firm. This brings us to efficiency, the third
lynch pin of neoclassical theory.
It can be argued that efficiency, as a societal value and as the value
premise of the neoclassical paradigm, finds its moral expression in the
Protestant Reformation.34 The concept of efficiency, embodied in truisms
such as "waste not, want not" and "a stitch in time saves nine," has
progressed from one of many policy considerations to the most important,
if not singular, consideration. It can be argued that the Protestant
Reformation converted efficiency from an evaluative consideration to a
moral imperative. Waste, sloth, and inefficiency became sinful, which
served the interests of the early entrepreneurial capitalists who used this
value to make performance of hard, poorly compensated, and frequently
dangerous work an indication of righteousness.35 Therefore, being
inefficient on the job, or in life in general, could be thought to impact not
only one's material existence, but also the eternal destination of one's soul.
Therefore, to the extent that the law recognizes the concept of
economic justice, such justice is evaluated from the perspective of the
individual acting rationally to achieve an efficient result. However, the
concept of economic justice does not seek to alleviate racial or genderbased oppression because the foundational economic premises view the
behavior of groups as merely the aggregation of the behavior of rational
individuals. If the rational decisions of individual actors result in
consequences that could be viewed as racially discriminatory, then the
discrimination must be a function of the individual characteristics of a

of reality expressed in a paradigmatic set of assumptions. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10-12 (1970).
33. Sherman, supra note 21, at 41.
34. WILK, supra note 5, at 110-12 (citing MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM

35. Id.

97 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1958) (1905)).

ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC THEORY

person suffering the adverse consequences, 36 not the result of the ideologies
of subordination, including white privilege and white superiority.37 Thus,
any individual's economic position is largely, if not exclusively, a function

of their personal characteristics, rather than oppression or exploitation.
It is not surprising that in the United States the middle class views
poverty as the result of the individual characteristics of the poor.38
Furthermore while most of the poor view their poverty as the result of
forces over which they have little control, many view their poverty as their
own fault. 39 This is highly problematic because we live in an economic
culture where, for the vast majority of individuals, participation in the

economy is a function of having a job. If you are unemployed or
underemployed, poverty is the likely consequence.
However, for economic policy makers, employment is not primarily
viewed as the means by which individuals participate in the economy, but
is seen as a policy instrument which can be used to enhance overall
economic performance.4 ° The policies that result from the acceptance of
neoclassical theory induce poverty for the purposes of enhancing corporate

profitability, encouraging capital market investment, and depressing
wages.4 Thus, in a society where employment is viewed as a policy

36. Sherman, supra note 21, at 44.
37. Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1407,
1409-13 (1990) (discussing white privilege and white superiority as ideologies that sanction the
subordination of racial and ethnic minorities of color in the United States).
38. Catherine Cozzarelli et al., Attitudes Towardsthe PoorandAttributionsfor Poverty, 57
J. SOC. ISSUES 207, 209-11 (2001). Interestingly, White participants in the study by Cozzarelli et
al. were much less likely to attribute poverty to structural cases than African-American
participants. White participants were much more likely to view poverty as resulting from the
characteristics of poor individuals, i.e., lack of effort, laziness, low intelligence, and drug
addiction. Id. at 209-10, 224.
39. Martha L. Fineman, Images ofMothers in PovertyDiscourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274,284
(199 1) (identifying a defining characteristic of underclass status as the belief among the poor that
their poverty is their own fault).
40. The Federal Reserve uses its ability to influence interest rates as a policy instrument to
either increase or decrease employment in the belief that such actions will enhance economic
performance. See Federal Reserve Board, Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, FED. RES.
BULL. 161 (2000).
41.
The rationale usually given for downsizing is that it will increase profits. Some
firms do find that downsizing increases their productivity and profits, and it may
lead to at least short-term increases in companies' stock prices. But there is now
a considerable body of evidence that reveals that these results are often
ephemeral. Studies show that downsizing companies "went on to trail their
industries in productivity, profitability and shareholder value."
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instrument, poverty is frequently the result of governmental policies, not the
characteristics of individuals. Nevertheless, mainstream neoclassical
economics invariably blames the victim for her oppression and often
convinces her to blame herself as well. 2
IV. CONFRONTING THEORY

The scientific pretenses of the neoclassical paradigm attempt to cloak
distributive consequences in an aura of inevitability while disconnecting
policy interventions from group and community consequences. For
instance, neoclassical theory, as used in law and economics, makes the
individual responsible for the quality of education received. Therefore, the
decision to drop out of school because you were never given a real
opportunity to master English is treated as a voluntary and rational
decision. Similarly, the decision to put your father in a nursing home rather
than to care for him yourself in your home becomes the most efficient use
of your time. The Machine Age values of the neoclassical paradigm do not
represent who we are or who we want to be as people.43 Moreover, the
neoclassical triumvirate of methodological individualism, economic
rationality, and efficiency ignores the human telos, or who we should

Judith D. Fischer, Public Policy and the Tyranny of the Bottom Line in the Terminationof Older
Workers, 53 S.C. L. REv. 211,230-31 (2002).
42.
The second major insidious consequence of stereotyping, is the internal effect,
or the negative effect on the stigmatized. This internal effect attributes a
discrediting quality to the victim, which the victim struggles against but may
eventually internalize as part of his or her self-image. Thus, the internal effect of
stereotyping serves the hegemonic function of having the victim accept his or her
negative attributes. The stereotype in essence forces the stigmatized group [to]
reflect those qualities that are being stereotyped.
Ediberto Roman, Who Exactly is Living La Vida Loca?: The Legal and PoliticalConsequences
of Latino-LatinaEthnic andRacial Stereotypes in Film and Other Media, 4 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 37, 41 (2000).
43. Efficiency, the primary value of neoclassical theory, is important to the operation of a
machine; however, an economically efficient result may not be a socially desirable result. Charles
R.P. Pouncy, The Rational Rogue: Neoclassical Economic Ideology in the Regulation of the
FinancialProfessional, 26 VT. L. REv. 263, 274 (2002). It may be economically efficient to
"mechanize" the adoption process by implementing Judge Posner's call for the establishment of
a free market in "healthy white infants" available for adoption. Richard A. Posner, Adoption and
Market Theory: The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 61 (1987). The
social desirability of reducing the establishment of families to mere market mechanisms appears
less clear.
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become." Instead, neoclassical theory consigns the fate of humanity to the
vagaries of markets that we permit to determine who we are,4" how we
live,46 and increasingly when and how we die.47 Thus, the animating
assumptions of neoclassical theory operate to convert people from
community-based, compassionate creators, to automated Machiavellian
consumers.48 Economic justice is not a concern of neoclassical theory.
Neoclassical theory is not designed to achieve economicjustice, and in fact
intervenes to prevent it.
Thus, because the neoclassical paradigm is blind to issues of economic
justice, thereby blinding the law to such concerns, it becomes necessary to
find additional theoretical constructs of the concept. Institutional
economics, unlike the neoclassical paradigm, does not maintain that only
the interaction of supply and demand should establish economic policy.49
Nor does it hold that the individual is the proper unit of economic analyses,
but is much more concerned with the interaction of individuals and groups

44. The concept of the human telos in this context assumes that humanity is, or should be,
more than the sum of its material processes, and should therefore adopt economic values that
promote justice and equality, consequences that the neoclassical value of efficiency fails to
contemplate.
45. See generally Deseriee A. Kennedy, Marketing Goods, Marketing Images: The Impact
ofAdvertising on Race, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 615, 618-21 (2000) (arguing that advertisements play
a critical role in maintaining racial identity).
46. See generally Vemellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming an Unjust Health
Care System to Meet the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127, 130-32 (1993)
(describing the difference in health care in regards to African-Americans).
47. See, e.g., Vince Galloro, Study: Death Rates Higher at For-Profits, 32 MOD.
HEALTHCARE 10 (2002) (reporting that patients in Canadian investor-owned hospitals were two
percent more likely to die when compared to patients at not-for-profit hospitals).
48. As used in social psychology, Machiavellianism as a personality characteristic refers to
"a cool detachment, which makes them [Machiavellians] less emotionally involved with other
people, with sensitive issues, or with saving face in embarrassing situations." Anusorn
Singhapakdi & Scott J. Vitell, Analyzing the Ethical Decision Making of Sales Professionals, J.
PERS. SELLING & SALES MGMT., Fall 1991, at 1, 3 (quoting JOHN P. ROBINSON & PHILLIP R.
SHAVER, MEASURES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICIAL ATTITUDES 592 (1973)).
49. Institutional economists maintain that economic theory premised on assumptions of
economic rationality and methodological individualism is so incomplete as to be of negligible
usefulness. Instead, institutionalists hold that a genuine economic analysis requires both an
examination of the behavior of real economics in real time and an analytical process that relies
on social, psychological and cultural forces in addition to economic theory. See Pouncy, supra note
24, at 313-22. "Institutional economics suggests an entirely different relationship between the
individual and economic theory than the relationship constructed by neoclassical theory.
Institutional economics recognizes that transactions or other economic decision-making reflect the
individual's personal psychology and ethical structure." Id. at 323. See also DUGGER, supra note
20, at xxviii.
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by means of transactions.5" For the institutional economist, the economy is
an evolving set of institutions which should be primarily focused in
provisioning society. 5
A construct of economic justice can be derived from institutional
economics value premises. Unlike the neoclassical paradigm, institutional
economics does not view efficiency as the principal value underlying
economic activity. Instead, institutional economic theory views efficiency
as a stagnant value with the tendency to memorialize and maintain the
existing distribution of assets, resources, and opportunities. Therefore,
institutional economics, focused on real economies in real time and the
consequence of economic decision-making for all people, not merely the
privileged and powerful, adopts the expansion of opportunity as its basic
value.52 Thus, institutional economics envisions understanding economic
justice in terms of the purposeful expansion of opportunities to participate
in the economy,53 and the absence of limitations on rightful access to the
assets, resources, and opportunities present or available in society.54
Therefore, economic justice is the absence of impediments or barriers to the
rightful access to assets, resources, and opportunities.
One ofthe main consequences ofthe neoclassical paradigm's lynch pins
of methodological individualism, economic rationality, and efficiency is the
promulgation of impediments and barriers to rightful access to assets,
resources, and opportunities. The neoclassical paradigm is a preservative
doctrine.55 It will maintain whatever distribution of assets, resources, and
opportunities exist in societies that accept its precepts. Because neoclassical
theory focuses on individual rather than group or societal processes, it
renders itself oblivious to historical inequities and oppression. Neoclassical
theory would have us believe that both market processes and the efforts of
market participants to maximize personal utility eliminate racial prejudice,
gender bias, and homophobia, among other things. Therefore, according to

50. DUGGER, supra note 20, at xix.

51. "Conventional economics defines the economy as choices made in the face of scarcity.
OIE [old institutional economics] defines the economy as an instituted process for provisioning
society." James Ronald Stanfield, The Scope, Method, and Significance of OriginalInstitutional

Economics, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 231, 232 (1999).
52. DUGGER, supra note 20, at 7-8.
53. Id.
54. Dugger uses this construction in discussing the institutionalist view of property rights,
which is developed from the basic institutionalist value premise, equality. Id. at 5, 7. Therefore,

"rightful access to opportunities" embraces both the institutionalist value premise of equality and
operationalizes it with regard to the appropriate distribution of assets, resources, and
opportunities. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 5.
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neoclassical theory, the reason why assets, resources, and opportunities
appear to be distributed preferentially to members of a certain race or
gender is because such individuals are better than others since race or
gender-based exploitation and oppression would be irrational. 6 If we are
waiting for the economic policies inspired by the neoclassical paradigm to
produce a just and equitable distribution of assets, resources, and
opportunities, we will be waiting for a very long time."
It is not merely fortuitous that the operation of economic law has
resulted in the allocation of the vast majority of assets, resources, and
opportunities to some people as opposed to others. Rather, the confluence
of law and neoclassical economic theory seeks to preserve the current
distribution regardless of the fact that our current distribution results from
race and gender-based oppression and exploitation. Therefore, to the extent
that the preservative character ofneoclassical economic theory is the enemy
of social, political, and economic change, neoclassical theory is the enemy
of economic justice.
Unfortunately, neoclassical economic theory has so thoroughly
infiltrated legal thinking that the result is a theory of law in which capitalism
is viewed as the only viable and legitimate form of economic life. Moreover,
the law marginalizes or ignores ideas and understandings that are outside
the purview of the neoclassical paradigm. The concept of economic justice
has received limited recognition in American jurisprudence because it
requires an understanding of human beings and human processes that lies
outside the parameters of conventional economic theory. Consequently,
neoclassical theory intervenes in society not just to preserve economic
inequality, but to recruit the economically oppressed to cooperate in their
own oppression.
56. However, as Sherman has demonstrated, racism functions as an enabling myth of racial
exploitation "because it helps the powerful to exploit and oppress minorities and to feel justified
in doing so. To propagate the irrational myth of racism may thus be perfectly rational for the ruling
class." Sherman, supra note 21, at 39, 44.
57. For example, Haynes & Husan examined the neoclassical inspired assumption of global
economic convergence, that is, in time, with appropriate neoclassical economic policies, underdeveloped economies will "catch-up" with developed economies, providing their citizens with
vastly improved standards of living. Michael Haynes & Rumy Husan, NationalInequalityand the
Catch-Up Period: Some "Growth Alone" Scenarios, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 693, 693-95 (2000).
Using economic growth assumptions that ranged from the pessimistic to the optimistic Haynes &
Husan concluded that under the more optimistic assumptions it would take developing African
economies approximately 89 years to catch-up to the developed Western economies. Id. at 699.
Using more pessimistic, but arguably more realistic years Haynes & Husan concluded it would
take 269 years to catch-up. Id.; see also Charles R.P. Pouncy, Stock Markets in Sub-Saharan
Africa: Western Legal Institutionsas a Component of the Neo-Colonial Project, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L

ECON. L. 85 (2002).
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V. ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN THE MARKETPLACE
In January 1999 the Wall StreetJournalpublished an article by Angelo
B. Henderson, entitled "Choosing a Caucasian Clone.""8 The article
recounted the experience of Judy Wiles, a White owner of an employment
agency. Although Eric Giles, an African-American employee, performed
most of the work that resulted in the acquisition of new clients for Wiles'
firm, the clients never got to meet him. 59 After Giles had done all of the
work on a file, it was turned over to a White employee to present to the
client and close the deal.60 Wiles said that she lost at least twenty contracts
because potential clients reacted negatively when she sent an AfricanAmerican to close the deal.6 The article also described Mel Farr, an
African-American owner of fifteen automobile franchises in Detroit, who
had a White man impersonate him in TV commercials because he was afraid
that Whites would not buy cars from an African-American owned
dealership.62 The article recounted numerous examples of African-American
entrepreneurs who do not represent their firms or themselves when dealing
with White customers, but instead choose to send a white clone to
impersonate them or to simply show up to close the deal.
Behavior resulting from self-hatred is beyond the scope of this Article.63
However, this phenomenon emphasizes the role of economic theory in
perpetuating a distribution ofassets, resources, and opportunities based on
race. First, Henderson's article suggests that people do not make decisions
rationally, but take irrational criteria, such as race, into consideration when
making business decisions or developing business policies and practices.
Second, it indicates that people do not base their decisions concerning
individuals exclusively on the characteristics of the individual with whom
they are transacting. Instead, a decision-maker will frequently base
decisions concerning individuals on beliefs held about the group of which

58. Angelo B. Henderson, Choosinga CaucasianClone, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 26, 1999, at Al.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id. This phenomena is particularly discouraging because of its tendency to perpetuate
the mythology of African-American underachievement, thereby reinforcing the exceptionality of
African-American accomplishment, reinforcing the beliefs that dissuade Whites from doing
business with African-Americans to begin with. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Who's Afraid of Tiger
Woods?, 19 CHICANo-LATINO L. REv. 223 (1998).

63. For a discussion of self-hatred and its impact on African-Americans, see RANDALL
83-88 (2000).
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the individual is a member.' The Detroit automobile dealer believed that
customers would not view him as a member of the millionaire community,
but rather as a member of the African-American community, a community
with which focus groups suggest that most Whites would prefer not to
deal.65 If neoclassical theory were correct, it would not be necessary for
African-American business people to send white clones to represent them.
Nevertheless, in this society Mr. Farr, the automobile dealer, is an example
of the absence of racism and discrimination because he was able to parlay
his football career into business success despite his blackness. The
unfortunate message conveyed by Henderson's article is to encourage
members of discriminated groups to be more like Mr. Farr, who was willing
to put on and take off undesirable group affiliations when doing so was
rational, meaning when it tended to increase his personal utility.'
This is just one of the many ways that society burdens the economic
aspirations of African-Americans and other people of color while
pretending, thanks to the limitations of neoclassical theory, that such
impediments simply do not exist. However, the excellent work of
Cassandra Jones Havard67 and Phyllis Craig-Taylor68 documenting the role
of race in the expropriation of ownership rights of African-American
farmers," and the work of Dorothy Brown detailing the differential impact
of the Internal Revenue Code on African-Americans, ° provide two
examples ofmany ways in which laws prevent African-Americans and other
people of color from attaining economic justice.
VI. CONCLUSION

All theories originating in the social sciences have the potential to serve
as societal interventions, depending on how widely they are adopted and
how strongly they are supported. The development of a theory of economic
64. See Cozzarelli et al., supra note 37, at 207-08.
65. Henderson, supra note 57.
66. Id. Interestingly, when Mr. Farr ran a promotion in which he was selling cars at $100
over invoice, he felt it was safe to come out of the closet and play himself in his TV ads, in the
belief that a deal this good could even overcome color. Id.
67. Cassandra Jones Havard, African-American Farmersand Fair Lending: Racializing
Rural Economic Space, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 333 (2001).
68. Craig-Taylor, supra note 11.
69. Havard, supra note 66, at 333-34; Craig-Taylor, supra note 11, at 740.
70. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, RacialEquality in the Twenty-First Century: What's Tax
Policy Got to Do with it, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 759 (1999); see, e.g., Dorothy A.
Brown, The MarriagePenalty/Bonus Debate: Legislative Issues in Black and White, 16 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 287 (1999).
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justice in American jurisprudence has been retarded by the predominance
of the neoclassical paradigm in the construction of economic behavior and
policy. Neoclassical theory intervenes in consensus reality to support the
notion of colorblind economics, an economic system in which markets
negate the impact of irrational criteria, such as race, in economic decisionmaking. However, the neoclassical paradigm is a model-making project
with little concern for the extent to which the models mirror reality.
Neoclassical theory works in concert with the preservative nature of law to
prevent the development ofajurisprudence of economicjustice. Therefore,
one of the primary goals of critical scholarship must remain the
demonstration of the role of economic ideology in the support and
maintenance of the ideologies of subordination.

